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Abstract—The recent advancements in wireless sensor 
hardware ensures sensing multiple sensor data such as 
temperature, pressure, humidity, etc. using a single hardware 
unit, thus defining it as multi-sensor data communication in 
wireless sensor networks (WSNs). The in-processing technique of 
data aggregation is crucial in energy-efficient WSNs; however, 
with the requirement of end-to-end data confidentiality it may 
prove to be a challenge. End-to-end data confidentiality along 
with data aggregation is possible with the implementation of a 
special type of encryption scheme called privacy homomorphic 
(PH) encryption schemes. This paper proposes an optimized PH 
encryption scheme for WSN integrated networks handling multi-
sensor data. The proposed scheme ensures light-weight payloads, 
significant energy and bandwidth consumption along with lower 
latencies. The performance analysis of the proposed scheme is 
presented in this paper with respect to the existing scheme. The 
working principle of the multi-sensor data framework is also 
presented in this paper along with the appropriate packet 
structures and process. It can be concluded that the scheme 
proves to decrease the payload size by 56.86% and spend an 
average energy of 8-18 mJ at the aggregator node for sensor 
nodes varying from 10-50 thereby ensuring scalability of the 
WSN unlike the existing scheme. 
Keywords—wireless sensor networks; homomorphic encryption 
scheme; data aggregation; energy-efficient WSNs; end-to-end data 
confidentiality; contiki-OS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have gained immense 
popularity in several applications due to their low-cost and 
low-power nature [1]. With the advent of the 6LoWPAN 
standard WSNs have light-weight IP capabilities such as 
transmission and reception of IPv6 data and the integration of 
the WSN with IP-based backbone networks such as the Internet 
[2], satellite [3], and Internet of Things [4]. Sensor nodes (SNs) 
today are capable of sensing multiple sensor data such as 
temperature, pressure, humidity, etc. all using the same sensor 
unit, therefore enabling a large number of different types of 
sensor data that can be sensed. However, with the recent 
advances in WSN technology in terms of IP network 
integration and multi-sensor data there still remains the 
eminent problem of ensuring end-to-end data confidentiality 
along with the implementation of in-processing techniques 
such as data aggregation [5] and multi-sensor data [6] in 
resources-constrained WSNs integrated with the Internet. 
Traditionally when data aggregation is implemented in WSNs 
the SNs transmit encrypted data to their aggregator nodes 
which decrypts the data, performs the data aggregation 
function over the plaintext sensor data and then re-encrypts the 
aggregated plaintext data prior to transmission towards the next 
node. This gives rise to hop-by-hop security which consumes 
more energy for every decryption/encryption and also induces 
a delay for the additional processing, all of which prove 
expensive for WSNs in terms of resources. Apart from the 
added security feature of end-to-end data confidentiality, end-
to-end security mechanisms remove the need for additional 
utilization of resources thereby proving to be more efficient 
compared to hop-by-hop security [7]. However, implementing 
data aggregation with end-to-end data confidentiality 
mechanisms is challenging since the data aggregation function 
at the aggregator nodes would require access to the plaintext 
sensor data in order to aggregate the sensor data [8]. Research 
in this aspect has led to the design and development of a 
special category of encryption schemes called Privacy 
Homomorphic (PH) encryption schemes [9] that ensure end-to-
end data confidentiality along with the implementation of data 
aggregation. PH schemes also ensure that the knowledge of 
encryption keys at intermediate nodes are not required since 
there are no intermediate decryptions of the ciphertext and the 
overall energy consumption of the network components and the 
induced latency can be reduced since there is no need for 
intermediate decryptions/encryptions. PH schemes can be 
broadly classified into asymmetric [10] and symmetric PH 
schemes. This paper mainly focuses on the symmetric PH 
schemes due to their low computational expense which proves 
to be suitable for resource-constrained networks and their 
computational delay which is several orders of magnitude 
lower as compared to asymmetric PH schemes. There has been 
a significant amount of research conducted in PH schemes for 
WSNs presented in [11] and out of the schemes proposed in 
[10] the Castelluccia-Mykletun-Tsudik (CMT) [12] scheme is 
chosen due to its low computational costs and simplicity which 
proves efficient for resource-constraint WSNs. However, 
despite the low computational costs and simplicity, the CMT 
scheme has the ID-issue which increases the overhead when 
the number of responding sensor nodes increase. This is mainly 
because the 16-bit node addresses of individual sensor nodes 
which participate in the data aggregation process are appended 
to the aggregated ciphertext during each transmission towards 
the end-user. Also, there is no support for multi-sensor data in 
the CMT scheme.  
This paper proposes an optimized version of the original 
CMT scheme in order to counter the ID-issue faced by the 
CMT scheme and ensure that the proposed scheme is more 
energy and bandwidth efficient for multi-sensor data and large 
scale WSNs. The proposed scheme is a slot-based CMT 
scheme (SCMT) which transmits bit-field information 
pertaining to the security keys used during encryption in order 
to determine and use the corresponding security keys for 
decryption such that the correct aggregated plaintext data is 
retrieved from the aggregated ciphertext data. This paper 
explains the principle working of the SCMT scheme and 
presents Contiki-OS [13] based simulation results of the energy 
consumed during the initialization and data transmission phase 
of the SCMT scheme for multi-sensor data and overall payload 
length in comparison to the existing CMT scheme. The 
remainder of this paper is as follows: Section 2 introduces the 
CMT algorithm and methods proposed by other authors to 
reduce the bandwidth consumption. Section 3 presents the 
working principle of the SCMT scheme along with the 
initialization and data transmission phase. Section 4 presents 
the simulation results of the payload length and the energy 
consumptions of the CMT and SCMT schemes. Section 5 
presents the future work and concludes the paper. 
II. RELATED WORK 
A privacy homomorphic encryption scheme is an 
encryption transformation which allows direct computation 
over ciphertext data. Let Q denote a modulus ring and + 
denotes the addition operations on the ring; if K is the key 
space and a, b  Q & k, k1, k2  K then a + b = Deck1,2 
(Enck1(a) + Enck2(b)) is termed as additively homomorphic 
with a single secret key k and a + b = Deck1,2(Enck1(a) + 
Enck2(b)) as additively homomorphic with k1 and k2 as the 
multiple secret keys [10]. The authors of [12] present an 
additively homomorphic stream cipher scheme known here as 
the Castelluccia Mykletun Tsudik (CMT) privacy 
homomorphic scheme, that allows data aggregation and end-to-
end data confidentiality. The main advantage of this scheme is 
that it uses modular arithmetic with very small moduli making 
this highly suitable for resource-constrained WSNs and 
achieving a significant bandwidth gain. However, a drawback 
of the proposed scheme is that the identities of non-responding 
sensor nodes or responding nodes need to be sent along with 
the aggregated ciphertext data to the Sink node which 
significantly increases the overhead costs thereby increasing 
the energy consumption. The working principle of the CMT 
scheme is as shown as follows: 
CMT Algorithm 
Parameters: Select a large integer M such that M = 2[log2 (t * n)] 
where t = max_sensor_value and n is the number of sensor 
nodes 
Encryption: If the message is m  [0, M-1] and a random 
keystream is k  [0, M-1] then the ciphertext is given as c = 
(m + k) mod M 
Decryption: Dec (c, k, M) = (c – K) mod M  
Aggregation: Let the ciphertexts be c1 = (m1 + k1) mod M & c2 
= (m2 + k2) mod M then the aggregation data is given by c1 + 
c2 = (m1 + m2) + (k1 + k2) mod M 
In order for the receiver to compute the aggregated 
plaintext data (m1 + m2) from the aggregated ciphertext data, 
the receiver should be able to determine the keysum value (k1 
+ k2) for a successful decryption which are obtained from the 
node IDs (16-bit or 64-bit IPv6 addresses). This proves to be 
expensive in terms of bandwidth consumption and induced 
packet overhead since as the number of responding sensor 
nodes increases the induced packet overhead which contains 
the IDs also increases thereby causing fragmentation of the 
packet and transmission of several packets. This inclusion of 
the sensor node IDs in the payload is termed as the ID-issue 
which is mainly addressed in this paper.  
The author of [14] introduced a symmetric probabilistic 
PH scheme, Domingo-Ferrer (DF), wherein addition, 
subtraction, multiplication and division can be performed on 
ciphertext data. The proposed homomorphism scheme was the 
first one to allow full arithmetic operations while being secure 
against the known-ciphertext attacks which requires that the 
ciphertext splitting is always used when encrypting with a 
splitting factor d >= 2 and the ciphertext space is much larger 
than the plaintext space. The DF algorithm uses a single 
symmetric key in every sensor node to encrypt the sensor data 
wherein the aggregator performs aggregation over the 
ciphertext and the end node decrypts the result using the same 
secret key. Thus, there is no need of appending the node IDs 
along with the ciphertext. However, this reduces the level of 
security despite the implementation of probabilistic encryption 
since the physical compromise of a single sensor node can 
disclose the secret key in use and induce several security 
attacks on the whole network. It is seen in [15] that value of d 
ranging from 2 to 4 proves to be beneficial for WSNs wherein 
the power consumption of the transmitting sensor nodes 
increases linearly with packet size. 
The authors of [16] evaluate three homomorphic algorithms 
suitable for WSNs and propose two approaches to mitigate the 
weaknesses of the algorithms in terms of the potential attacks 
and low security level. The first approach is the successful 
combination of two algorithms (DF and CMT) which increases 
the security and the minimization of additional efforts by the 
careful selection of parameters such as the splitting factor. The 
second approach tackles specific weaknesses by considering 
homomorphic message authentication codes and also describes 
in detail the ID-issue of the CMT scheme. The authors of [16] 
integrate the CMT algorithm with the Concealed Data 
Aggregation (CDA) algorithm which is the DF scheme in order 
to create a cascading encryption. The inner encryption function 
is CMT which suffers from the ID-issue and its malleable 
nature. However, the malleability can be countered by the 
implementation of an outer encryption transformation such as 
the DF, where the knowledge of the secret key is needed to 
modify the content of a single data packet. The advantage of 
this combination is that the aggregation requires exactly the 
same computational effort as the standalone DF. From the 
results presented in [16] it was seen that the hybrid scheme of 
DF and CMT proves to be 5 times more efficient in terms of 
bandwidth gain. However, this hybrid scheme is not scalable to 
large number of sensor nodes as the further increase of 
responding nodes increases the bandwidth utilization. 
III. SLOT-BASED CMT SCHEME 
The Slot-based Castelluccia Mykletun Tsudik (SCMT) 
privacy homomorphic encryption scheme for multi-sensor data 
is designed as an optimized version of the CMT scheme 
wherein the ID issue highlighted in [12] is being addressed. 
The scheme mainly creates a variable length bit slot at the 
Cluster Head (CH) nodes. The status of each bit in the slot 
determines if a particular Sensor Node (SN) participated in the 
data aggregation process of ciphertext sensor data. The 
information contained in the slots are used by the Remote 
Monitoring Station (RMS) to decrypt the aggregated ciphertext 
data in to its respective aggregated plaintext sensor data for 
each sensor data type. The network architecture considered for 
this paper is as shown in Fig. 1. It mainly consists of the WSN 
which has several wireless sensor nodes (SNs), deployed 
within the sensing region in a star topology cluster-based node 
layout scheme [17]. 
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Figure 1: General network architecture employed for the SCMT scheme 
The individual SNs within each cluster encrypts the sensor 
data using the SCMT encryption scheme and transmits the 
encrypted sensor data to their respective CH nodes which in 
turn proceeds to aggregate the ciphertext sensor data received 
from several SNs within the WSN cluster. Upon completion of 
the data aggregation process the ID-slot and the Data-slot, 
which are variable bit slots depending on the number of SNs 
and the different types of sensor data types, are updated and 
appended to the aggregated ciphertext data and transmitted to 
the Sink node. The Sink node acts as a bridge between the 
6LoWPAN and the Internet and upon reception of the 
aggregated ciphertext and the respective slots the data packet 
from the Sink node is transmitted over the Internet as a full 
IPv6 packet to the RMS. When the RMS receives the full IPv6 
packet it obtains the payload which contains the respective 
slots and the aggregated ciphertext sensor data. The SCMT 
decryption process is then employed wherein the information 
in the slots are used for the correct decryption of the aggregated 
ciphertext data in to the respective aggregated plaintext data. 
Each SN can be assumed as a single unit that consists of 
several on-board sensors capable of sensing different types of 
sensor data such as temperature, pressure, humidity, etc. and 
thus forms what is termed as a multi-sensor unit which 
transmits multi-sensor data (temperature, pressure, humidity, 
etc.). For instance, if there are 8 different types of sensor data 
that can be transmitted by multi-sensor units (SNs) within each 
WSN cluster then the size of the Data-slot will be m, where m 
is 8 bits in length, and the size of the ID-slot will be n, where n 
is the total number of SNs within each cluster. Suppose there 
are only 4 types out of the 8 types of sensor data information 
transmitted by 8 out of the 10 SNs within each WSN cluster 
then the Data-slots and ID slots will be updated accordingly as 
shown in Fig. 2. 
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Figure 2: Updating of the Data-slot and the ID-slot by the SCMT scheme 
It is seen from Fig. 2 that the sensor data types {D1, D3, D4 
and D6} are transmitted from 8 out of 10 SNs. For the data 
types {D1 and D3} the SNs that do not transmit the 
corresponding data types are {S5 and S6} and for the data types 
{D4 and D6} the SNs that do not transmit data the 
corresponding data types are {S1 and S8}. The Data-slot and 
the ID-slot is set to 1 and zero respectively, as shown in Fig. 2 
where ‘1’ in the Data-slot signifies the transmission of a 
particular sensor data type and in the ID-slot it signifies that the 
CH node received encrypted sensor data from a particular SN. 
A ‘0’ in the Data-slot signifies no transmission of a particular 
sensor data type and in the ID-slot it signifies that the CH node 
did not receive encrypted data from a particular SN. Once the 
slots are updated the final data packet to be transmitted from 
the CH node is generated as shown in Fig. 2. The size of this 
packet is significantly smaller than the CMT scheme since the 
IDs (16-bit or 64-bit addresses) are not appended in the data 
packet since they are replaced by light-weight bit slots. 
However, in order for the SCMT scheme to work efficiently 
and accurately there needs to be an initialization phase which is 
responsible for setting up the structure of the slots at the CH 
node and the RMS. Thus, the SCMT scheme mainly consists of 
2 phases; the initialization phase and the data transmission 
phase. 
A. Initialization Phase 
The initialization phase is triggered upon network setup and 
is considered as a one-time process unless it is invoked due to 
changes within the WSN such as node failure, security breach, 
mobility, etc. All the messages exchanged during the 
initialization phase is as shown in Fig. 3 along with their 
general packet structures. For each data packet transmission 
there is a 16-bit sequence number (SEQN) and a 16-bit 
checksum (CRC) appended in order to ensure data freshness 
and data integrity at the receiving nodes respectively. During 
the reception process the type of control message (Mtype) 
received is determined, the packet is checked for freshness and 
the packet is checked for any errors induced due to noisy 
channel conditions. The 8-bit control flags field in each 
message depicts the processes which are set/unset and are as 
follows: 
• ENC – No encryption (0); Encryption (1) 
• MOB – No node mobility (0); Node mobility (1) 
• D_TYPE – homogeneous data (0); heterogeneous data (1) 
• DISS_TYPE - Random (00); Periodic (01); Event-driven 
(10); On-demand (11) 
• ID – No ID-slot (0); ID-slot (1) 
• D_ID – No Data-slot (0); Data-slot (1) 
• OF – No payload overflow (0); Payload overflow (1) 
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INIT_REQ (8B)
INIT_RES ((8 + 3m)B)
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Figure 3: Message exchange during initialization phase of the SCMT scheme 
The RMS node broadcasts an initialization request message 
(INIT_REQ) via the Sink node which is received by all 
neighboring CH nodes. This message signifies the start of the 
initialization process and consists mainly of the desired sensor 
data dissemination period (DISStime) which is 16-bits in length 
(0 – 65535s). When the CH node receives this message the data 
freshness and integrity checks are performed and upon 
successful verification a join request message (JREQ) is 
broadcasted to all SNs within the respective WSN cluster 
which mainly consists of the DISStime data field. When this 
broadcast message is received by the SNs it checks for data 
freshness and integrity and upon successful verification the 
SNs transmit a unicast join response message (JRES) to the CH 
node which mainly consists of an a 8-bit data type length field 
that holds the value of m along with the m different data types 
IDs (8-bit each). The data type ID is used to identify the type of 
sensor data that is received (temperature, pressure, etc.) and it 
is transmitted only during the initialization phase. When the 
CH node receives the JRES messages from the individual SNs 
within the WSN cluster the CH node checks for data freshness 
and data integrity of each message before updating the Data-
slot and the ID-slot. Upon the successful verification of each 
JRES message within a time period (Tsetup), which is the time 
period the CH node will wait for the JRES messages from the 
SNs, the structure for the ID-slot and Data-slot is generated. 
The slot lengths along with the SN IDs and the data type IDs 
are transmitted as an initialization response message 
(INIT_RES) to the RMS via the Sink node. When the RMS 
receives the INIT_RES message it proceeds to build the key-ID 
table for each sensor data type as shown in Fig. 4. It is seen 
from Fig. 4 that at the CH node the ID table contains only the 
node addresses (ID1, ID2 … IDn) along with the bit slot. At the 
RMS the key-ID table contains the same ID-table along with 
the respective security keys of the individual SNs. Once the 
tables are setup, the RMS node broadcasts a data transmission 
message (DATA_TX) which is then received by the CH node 
and broadcasted to the SNs thereby indicating that the 
initialization phase was successfully complete. 
ID3 ID7 ID1 ID8 ID2 ID10 ID6 ID4 ID5 ID9
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0ID-Slot
SN IDs
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10Slot Indexes
K3 K7 K1 K8 K2 K10 K6 K4 K5 K9
ID table at CH node
Key-ID table at the RMS Security Keys  
Figure 4: Basic structure of the slots built during the initialization phase of the 
SCMT scheme at the CH node and the RMS 
B. Data Transmission Phase 
Upon reception of the DATA_TX broadcast message the 
SNs proceed to collect sensor data and transmit the encrypted 
data using the SCMT encryption scheme. If mj is the plaintext 
sensor data collected by SN j and M is a large integer then the 
ciphertext sensor data can be given as cj = (mj + kj)mod M 
where kj is the unique secret key to sensor node j. The 
encrypted data packet is then transmitted to the CH node which 
receives several such similar data packets from SNs within its 
cluster. Upon reception of each message the CH node verifies 
data freshness and data integrity of each message before 
updating the Data-slot and the ID-slot set up during the 
initialization phase. Once the verification is successful and the 
slots have been updated successfully for each type of sensor 
data received, the CH node performs the data aggregation 
process using the ciphertext values of the respective sensor data 
types and appends the aggregated ciphertext values of each 
sensor data type to the data packet to be transmitted to the Sink 
node. Upon reception of the aggregated ciphertext data of 
different data types the Sink node encapsulates the entire 
payload filed, which includes the slots and the respective 
aggregated data, into the payload field of a full IPv6 packet and 
transmits it to the RMS via the Internet. The entire data 
transmission process is as shown in Fig. 5 where the packet 
structure for each packet transmitted at every node is depicted. 
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Encrypted Multi-Sensor Data
Mtype||CF||SEQ||C1||…||Cm||CRC
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Aggregated ciphertext data
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…||AGGm||CRC Full IPv6 data packet
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Figure 5: Message exchange during data transmission phase of the SCMT 
scheme 
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS 
The open source operating system Contiki [13] designed for 
the Internet of Things (IoT) enables a wireless sensor node to 
connect to the Internet. The java-based simulator Cooja [18] 
designed for the Contiki OS allows the rapid deployment of a 
simulation test-bed of a WSN with Internet connectivity that 
supports the WSN standard of 6LoWPAN. Hence the simulator 
Cooja was used in the Contiki OS environment to gather 
simulation results presented in this paper which focuses on the 
energy consumption of the radio and CPU usage of each 
process of the SN and the CH node when the SCMT scheme 
for multi-sensor data is employed. The simulation is divided 
into two phases; the initialization phase analysis and the data 
transmission analysis. Prior to analyzing the average energy 
consumption this paper also highlights the payload size of the 
SCMT scheme for varying number of SNs within the WSN 
cluster thereby signifying the percentage decease in payload 
size of the SCMT scheme over the CMT scheme. In order to 
determine the percentage decrease in payload sizes of the 
SCMT scheme over the CMT scheme a varying number of SNs 
within a WSN cluster ranging from 10 to 50 is considered in 
this paper. Also the analysis is performed over varying 
responding percentages (0.1, 0.25 and 0.5) which can be 
defined as the percentage of SNs within the cluster that 
transmit data over the total number of SNs within the cluster. 
For a given range of M (0 to 4.2*109) the ciphertext size is 32 
bits or 4 bytes in length (log2 (M)) and for every byte increase 
of the ciphertext data the range of M is multiplied by 256. 
Thus, with the ciphertext data length at 4B the payload sizes of 
the CMT and the SCMT scheme for varying number of SNs 
and responding percentages is as shown in Fig. 6. 
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Figure 6: Comparison of payload sizes between the CMT and SCMT scheme 
It is important to note that the CMT scheme does not 
support multi-sensor data transmission and it is safe to assume 
that if there were 8 different types of sensor data then the CMT 
scheme would transmit the 8 different data types as individual 
packets, thereby increasing the computation and transmission 
costs by 8 times. However, for the comparison of the SCMT 
scheme with the CMT scheme Fig. 6 considers single sensor 
data transmission for the CMT scheme and multi-sensor data (8 
different data types) transmission for the SCMT scheme. 
Despite supporting multi-sensor data the SCMT scheme proves 
to be 56.86% lighter in terms of payload size compared to the 
CMT scheme which supports single sensor data transmission 
for 50 SNs and 8 different sensor data types. 
Due to the resource constrain nature of the WSNs it is 
imperative to have a clear understanding of the energy budget 
when a new framework is introduced. The processes that 
consume energy when the SCMT scheme for multi-sensor data 
is employed are as follows; radio listen which is a process that 
listens to any incoming traffic and radio transmit which is a 
process that transmits data packets which can be collectively 
classified as the radio energy consumption along with the 
energy consumed due to the processing of data (encryption, 
decryption, slotting, etc.) can be classified as the CPU energy 
consumption. The energest power tool provided by the Contiki 
OS is used to calculate the total radio and CPU energy 
consumptions during the initialization phase and the data 
transmission phase. For the analysis in this paper, the radio and 
CPU energy consumption at the CH node is particularly 
important as majority of the proposed scheme is operational at 
the CH node. The SNs only add a small overhead (1-3 Bytes) 
which does not affect the energy consumed by the SNs 
significantly in comparison to the CMT scheme. The average 
radio and CPU energy consumption of the SN during the 
initialization phase is 620 µJ and 75 µJ respectively. The radio 
and CPU energy consumption at the CH node during the 
initialization is as shown in Fig. 7 for SNs ranging from 10 to 
50 SNs within the WSN cluster. 
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Figure 7: Energy consumption of the CH node during the initialization phase of 
the SCMT scheme 
It is seen that with the increase in the number of SNs the 
radio energy consumption increases due to the increased packet 
size of the INIT_RES message which contains the 16-bit IPv6 
address of individual SNs within the cluster. The CPU usage 
also increases since larger slots need to be formulated at the 
CH node with the increase in the number of SNs. The radio and 
CPU energy consumption at the CH node during the data 
transmission phase of the CMT and SCMT scheme for 8 
different types of sensor is as shown in Fig. 8 for SNs ranging 
from 10 to 50 SNs within the WSN cluster. 
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Figure 8: Energy consumption of the CH node during the data transmission 
phase of the CMT and SCMT scheme 
The energy consumption analysis varies for increasing 
number of sensor data types (m) and increasing number of SNs 
(n). From the above analysis it can be concluded that the 
energy consumption is moderate when 8 different sensor data 
types are considered for a maximum of 50 SNs for the SCMT 
scheme. However, there is a significant increase in the energy 
consumption when the CMT scheme was employed for the 
same scenario where the 8 independent transmissions were 
made in order simulate the effect of the multi-sensor data (8 
different sensor data types). For a maximum of 50 SNs within a 
single WSN cluster there is a 93.82% energy consumption 
when the SCMT scheme is used for multi-sensor data. 
Therefore, this proves that the additional ID overheads in the 
CMT scheme and the lack of multi-sensor data support in the 
CMT scheme makes the SCMT scheme a highly energy and 
bandwidth efficient scheme for privacy homomorphic 
encryption schemes in WSNs for multi-sensor data. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The main ID-issue of the CMT scheme [12] is being 
addressed in this paper with the implementation of a bit field 
slotting mechanism. The only drawback of the proposed 
scheme is that the initialization phase must be successfully 
completed prior to the data transmission phase. Since the 
initialization phase is a one-time process it may be periodically 
triggered over long intervals of time or in the case of large 
number of node failures. However, it is worth considering the 
effects of mobility of SNs and the CH node as it will invoke 
the initialization phase for every node entry or exit. In terms of 
the payload sizes the SCMT scheme proves to be significantly 
lighter than the CMT scheme since the IDs of SNs are not 
appended to the aggregated ciphertext data. There is a 56.86% 
decrease in the payload size compared to the CMT scheme 
which proves to twice as efficient compared to the CMT 
scheme in terms of energy consumption since the energy 
consumed mainly depends on the packet size of the data being 
transmitted. In terms of the energy consumption of the CH 
node during the initialization phase, for every increase in the 
number of SNs by 10 the energy consumed by the radio for 
reception and transmission is increased by 16.85% of the 
energy consumed for 10 SNs. Similarly for the data 
transmission phase the energy consumed by the radio is 
increased by 23.68% of the energy consumed for 10 SNs. With 
the advancement in WSNs which enable SNs to measure 
multiple sensor data it is important to understand the energy 
consumption of the multi-sensor data transmission when 
homomorphic encryption is implemented along with data 
aggregation. Also, with respect to the data transmission phase 
of the SCMT scheme compared to the CMT scheme it is 
evident that the SCMT scheme is highly efficient for large-
scalable WSNs that support multi-sensor data with an average 
energy efficiency between 87% - 93% for SNs varying from 10 
to 50 within the WSN cluster. This paper proposes a light-
weight homomorphic encryption scheme for multi-sensor data 
transmission within large scale WSN integrated networks. 
Work in progress with respect to this paper is to incorporate 
node mobility and evaluate the effects of storing and mapping 
the ID-slot tables in the most efficient way at the aggregator 
nodes when SNs join and leave a WSN cluster, thereby, 
creating a dynamic environment for the SCMT scheme with 
varying channels conditions and bit error rates which may 
significantly affect the ID-slots generated. 
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